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FORTHCOMING: INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
DO SELF-REPORTING REGIMES MATTER?
EVIDENCE FROM THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE *
Cosette D. Creamer & Beth A. Simmons
ABSTRACT
International regulatory agreements depend largely on self-reporting for
implementation, yet we know almost nothing about whether or how such
mechanisms work. We theorize that self-reporting processes provide information
for domestic constituencies, with the potential to create pressure for better
compliance. Using original data on state reports submitted to the Committee
Against Torture, we demonstrate the influence of this process on the pervasiveness
of torture and inhumane treatment. We illustrate the power of self-reporting
regimes to mobilize domestic politics through evidence of civil society
participation in shadow reporting, media attention, and legislative activity around
anti-torture law and practice. This is the first study to evaluate systematically the
effects of self-reporting in the context of a treaty regime on human rights outcomes.
Since many international agreements rely predominantly on self-reporting, the
results have broad significance for compliance with international regulatory
regimes globally.
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I.

Introduction

One of the central debates in international and comparative politics concerns the role of
international legal norms in influencing state behavior. Skeptics believe international law is weak
and epiphenomenal to state preferences. Other scholars claim it has been important in moving
states towards compliance with international norms. Nowhere has the debate been more strongly
articulated than in the area of international human rights, where the effect of international law
has been found to be highly conditional.
The international human rights regime rests at least in part on a compliance mechanism
common to domestic regulation: self-reporting. In fact, self-reporting is central to the
maintenance of most major international agreements (Dai 2002:405). The human rights regime
exemplifies this heavy (though non-exclusive) dependence on self-supplied information: every
major international human rights treaty requires states to submit reports to treaty monitoring
bodies. Despite this, the theoretical and empirical work linking this self-reporting process with
states’ actual human rights practices is quite underdeveloped. Case studies exist, but to date are
few in number, limited in geographic scope, and do not advance a general framework for
understanding the mechanisms that link self-reporting and rights outcomes (McQuigg 2011).
While an extensive literature explores self-reporting in domestic regulatory schemes (Kaplow
and Shavell 1994), there is almost no comparable research internationally.
We argue that state self-reporting to external bodies can contribute to improved
implementation of and compliance with international obligations, largely by improving the
domestic informational environment, which in turn stimulates the mobilization of domestic
constituencies. Certainly, this is not a completely novel claim. Chayes and Chayes (1995:109-30)

pointed out years ago that treaty commitments raise expectations of compliance which in turn
could be managed through encouragement and information. We emphasize that information is
especially central for domestic stakeholders’ ability to mobilize and hold governments
accountable for compliance with international human rights treaties. Indeed, the historical record
shows that the utility of self-reporting was raised as a means to raise domestic accountability
during the discussions surrounding the Convention against Torture in the early 1980s. 1
We provide evidence that connects the international review process to domestic
implementation through three related and reinforcing informational conduits: (1) civil society
mobilization around the review process to collect and disseminate alternative sources of
information; (2) media coverage providing information on the status of state implementation,
which raises citizens’ expectations for compliance; and (3) legislative deliberation over
information supplied by the treaty body on implementation deficiencies. Our theory thus
elucidates the structured pathways available to challenge potentially biased state-supplied
information and to enable mobilization and deliberation among domestic stakeholders. We argue
that international processes that stimulate these local accountability dynamics can facilitate
human rights improvements on the ground. 2
For evidence, we draw from original data on reports submitted to the Committee against
Torture (CmAT), which is charged with monitoring the Convention against Torture (CAT). We
investigate the contribution this reporting-and-review process makes to reducing torture
prevalence. Cumulative interaction with the CmAT is important because it exposes continuing

While some states argued for extensive jurisdiction for the Committee against Torture, on the basis that “selfpolicing by states has not been entirely successful,” others resisted the idea that any implementation committee
should have “extensive jurisdiction.” Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on a Draft
Convention against Torture, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1982/L.40, paras 53 et seq.
2
Much research stresses the importance of information, transparency, and accountability as determinants of
government performance (Besley and Burgess 2002, Adsera et. al. 2003, Hollyer et.al. 2014).
1
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shortcomings, elicits contradictory evidence, and re-sets domestic goals and expectations
iteratively. 3 We find positive, systematic evidence that repeat engagement in the report-andreview process has produced modest human rights improvements on the ground. Evidence of
civil society activation, media attention, and legislative activity suggests that domestic
constituencies do in fact become aware of and are mobilized by the self-reporting process,
setting the stage to demand, debate, and implement improvements over time.
This article proceeds as follows. Section II theorizes the use of torture and the role that selfreporting and periodic review play in influencing torture practices on the ground. Section III
presents evidence on the average effect of a country’s history of engagement with the treaty
monitoring body on torture practices around the world. Section IV documents three arenas of
relevant political activity that illustrate our domestic informational theory, using primary civil
society, media, and legislative evidence for a sample of Latin American countries. The final
section concludes with broad implications of our findings and a research agenda for the future.

II.

Self-reporting, Torture and International Review in Domestic Politics

Self-reporting in the international human rights regime

The legal regime for international human rights was designed to provide accountability
through the collection and public dissemination of information about governments’ treaty
implementation. Almost every major human rights convention establishes an oversight

This process resembles the recursivity described by the literature on “experimentalist governance,” although our
account does not necessarily involve the revision of collective goals, standards, or rules at the international level.
See the discussion in Sabel and Zeitlin (2010: 4).

3
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committee, comprised of independent experts nominated and elected by states parties. States
parties must submit periodic reports to such committees on measures adopted to give effect to
their human rights obligations. The CAT requires states parties to submit an initial report within
one year of ratification or accession, and subsequent periodic reports at least every four years
thereafter. 4 These reports are expected to, and often do, provide information about torture
allegations. They also describe policy measures the state has adopted—from limiting pretrial
detentions to prison reform to police training—deemed by the international community to help
reduce the occurrence of torture or cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment. The treaty
monitoring body then considers states’ reports in the presence of government representatives.
Through a “constructive dialogue” the committee questions representatives, acknowledges
progress made, and identifies areas for improvement, after which it issues a set of observations
containing recommendations for any further reforms (O'Flaherty 2006:36). This entire process is
known as “periodic review,” with all state reports and committee recommendations made public.
Periodic review was intended to play a central role in encouraging treaty implementation
and compliance (Keller and Ulfstein 2012:2). However, the system is often criticized as
inadequate, ineffective, and even “in crisis” (Alston and Crawford 2000:1-12, Bayefsky 2001:310). Some point to the professional inadequacies of the “expert” committees, while others note
that even resource rich, democratic states do not do what they are told to do by said experts
(McQuigg 2011:827). Hafner-Burton articulates an informal (though untested) consensus among
commentators, that “the reports often don’t seem to lead to results that matter” (Hafner-Burton
2013:100). Moreover, there is a growing sense among critics that as treaties proliferate, the
reporting system as a whole is breaking under its own unwieldy weight (Posner 2014:Ch.2.2).

4

Convention Against Torture, Article 19(1).
6

One result may be widespread late- and non-reporting (Hampson 2007:12-14, Schöpp-Schilling
2007:202-05). For example, of the 162 states parties to CAT by the end of 2017, twenty-five
(15.4%) had still not submitted their initial report (Somalia’s initial report was the latest at
twenty-six years) and an additional thirty-seven countries (22.8%) had at least one subsequent
periodic report overdue. 5 Moreover, the quality of reports submitted to the CmAT vary
considerably across countries and over time (Creamer and Simmons 2015:598-607). But these
criticisms often overlook how reporting provides domestic actors with new empirical and
normative information, which in turn facilitates domestic mobilization and offers a crucial
platform for human rights accountability.

Torture and Inhumane Treatment: The Role of Information

Torture is a tough practice to influence. It is hard to detect (Rejali 2007:1-15), it is
committed in a decentralized fashion (Lutz and Sikkink 2000:639), and its use involves a series
of principal-agent relationships that complicate policy impacts (Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011).
Those who inflict or order inhumane treatment often believe it can be a useful tool of political
and social control (Hajjar 2009:313-15). The benefits of torture tend to outweigh its costs under
three conditions: (1) when no one in a position to impose consequences knows that it is
happening; or (2) when few think it is wrong; or (3) when there is confidence about its utility. If
any of these conditions prevail, governments or their agents are likely to torture when they think

The number of parties with overdue reports includes those with officially revised due dates, a deviation from strict
periodicity that helps the CmAT manage its heavy workload. For countries delinquent on their initial reports, the
CmAT has begun reviewing states in the absence of a report.

5
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it will be useful, and especially then they face violent threats to government stability or national
security (Conrad and Moore 2010:473-74).
Policymakers themselves do not always determine torture outcomes, since leaders cannot
control all decentralized state agents who may be tempted to commit physical or psychological
abuses (Conrad and Moore 2010:461-63). Conversely, central policy makers may not be able to
inflict torture strategically if societal norms are strong enough; agent resistance is also possible.
While stopping torture completely has proven elusive in nearly every society, reducing it may be
possible, at least in theory.
We theorize that a key variable in reducing practices of torture and other forms of
inhumane treatment is availability of information to domestic stakeholders. Two types of
information are central: normative (what is considered right and wrong, appropriate and
inappropriate) and empirical (what states are doing in practice). International conventions are
central in generating and disseminating both kinds of information. Normatively, treaties are
authoritative public statements of values. Even though they are sometimes signed cynically, 6
they have been shown to shape understandings of what is and is not acceptable human rights
behavior. 7 Treaties have become focal normative instruments in the sense that they are (nearly
universally ratified) statements of the international community’s values relating to human rights.
Their formality enhances their ability to influence normative understandings and expectations
(Morrow 2014:17). The major human rights agreements are not only obligatory as a matter of

There is a significant literature on treaty ratification which does not refer to their normative pull, emphasizing
instead compliance costs (Hathaway 2007); low cost concession to political opposition (Vreeland 2008); or
indicative of a willingness to violate rights, even if the international reputational costs are high (Hollyer and
Rosendorff 2011).
7
A growing body of experimental research points in this direction (Chilton 2015, Kreps and Wallace 2016).
6
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international law. More importantly for our purposes, they are normatively informative
documents.
Reporting to international monitoring bodies underscores the normative message of treaty
commitments. Report submission tacitly acknowledges an obligation to implement an
international agreement and communicates this understanding internationally and domestically.
The expectation to report mounts when other states within a country’s region do so, suggesting
that self-reporting communicates social expectations among peers in particular (Creamer and
Simmons 2015:596-97). When states participate in the report-and-review process, they at a
minimum acknowledge their putative normative commitments to the CAT.
The report-and-review process itself reveals and disseminates very specific normative
information. The entire exercise is an extended revelation of what the treaty requires, and indeed
what torture is. Nowhere could this be clearer than in the CmAT’s 2006 concluding observations
on the United States’ practices: torture was not to be construed as “limited to ‘prolonged mental
harm’ as set out in [the United States’] understandings…but constitutes a wider category of acts,
which cause severe mental suffering, irrespective of their prolongation or its duration.” 8 By
publicizing such information, the CmAT members are not simply lecturing U.S. representatives
on their obligations; they are informing a broader audience about anti-torture norms more
generally and what normatively defines torture and cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment.
In addition to normative information, the self-reporting process reveals empirical
information as well. States are required to supply data on laws that are passed, statistics on
allegations of torture and other physical integrity abuses, and details about investigations and

Committee against Torture, Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture: United States, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (25 July 2006), para. 13. Provision of such normative information is by no means the exception,
it is in fact typical of the CmAT’s concluding observations since 1990.
8
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prosecutions of these reported allegations. For example, Argentina’s 2002 report documents
“[i]nvestigation of occurrences, acts or omissions that may entail disciplinary responsibility”
broken down by province, process, and status/disposition. 9 Empirical material on criminal
statutes, amnesties, sentencing, statutes of limitations, criminal procedures, and conditions of
pre-trial detention are described. Prison conditions—from the food provided to the size of prison
cells—are frequently detailed. Importantly, information provision is not the role of state alone.
Committee members compare and contrast empirical information to other sources of information
from non-governmental organizations and various UN special rapporteurs. The process of selfreporting sets off an empirical discussion of practices, accomplishments, and continued
shortcomings among state representatives, civil society organizations, and international experts.

Why (not) Report?

We therefore conceptualize self-reporting as an information generating and disclosing
process in which civil society organizations, politicians, government officials, the media, and
private citizens are able to participate. Clearly, governments vary in their willingness to disclose
practices about many things, including state-sponsored rights violations. Political leaders must
balance the expectations raised by reporting with its possible political consequences. Many
leaders strike the balance by turning in reports that are biased or unrevealing. Even democracies
sometimes have incentives to spin or hide information from voters, although this is much harder
given democratic norms and institutions supporting transparency (Magee and Doces 2015:22324).
Committee against Torture, Fourth Periodic Report: Argentina, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/55/Add.7 (2 August 2002),
paras 151 et seq.

9
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Although regime type does not predict the likelihood of reporting to the CmAT, it does
predict the quality of reports submitted. Democracies generally submit reports that identify
implementation and compliance shortcomings and that respond to concerns of the treaty
monitoring body; autocracies, much less so. When “transparency reveals to the mass public that
the leadership is underperforming and ensures that this perception is widely shared,” collective
action and mobilization is more likely (Hollyer, et al. 2015:765).
The behavior of newly transitioned democracies is especially illustrative of this act of
balancing reporting expectations with risky information disclosure. Such states often face active
domestic civil societies that are more likely to scrutinize the reporting process than citizens in
autocracies (who expect whitewash and may not even be aware of the process) or possibly even
in democracies (where information is plentiful and therefore has a taken-for-granted quality).
Consistent with this interpretation of the reporting dilemma, new democracies are much less
likely to report than other regime types, but the quality of their reports tends to be exceptionally
high (Creamer and Simmons 2015:606-07). This pattern hints at an interesting political
balancing act: autocracies report, but often whitewash; democracies report with quality
information; transitioning democracies don’t report until they are better prepared to engage the
political consequences of human rights transparency. Understood in this way, the decision to
self-report on implementation of international human rights norms is an integral aspect of the
domestic process of mobilization, dialogue, and commitment-making. Importantly, however,
reporting itself is not correlated with preexisting rights performance, suggesting it is not the case
that only good performers are willing to participate.

11

Reporting, information and domestic reform

While there are good reasons to be skeptical of the balance and veracity of all state
reports, the informational environment is enriched by alternative assessments. The Committee
and civil society use the event of report submission as an opportunity to press the government to
provide more empirical information and contend with alternative accounts of the rights situation
on the ground. The Committee itself also provides ‘expert’ normative information through its
concluding observations and recommendations. The information flowing from the reporting
process is distinct from the ambient level of human rights criticism from a plethora of rights
organizations and political critics. State reports are read and discussed by recognized and
independent experts, they are not just the shaming exercises states expect from NGOs who may
be perceived as anti-government or having a western bias. Additionally, the information
available from the reporting process is periodic but not incessant, rendering it more salient than
the general information flowing from NGOs and media alone. All this information is publicly
available, which facilitates collective action and mobilization around areas of underperformance.
We argue therefore that the reporting process has consequences independent of whether the
report itself is evasive or inaccurate.
For several reasons we expect the impact of reporting-and-review cycles (which includes
shadow reports submitted by civil society organizations) to be cumulative rather than a simple
one-shot effect. First, repeat report-and-review cycles reinforce a state’s treaty obligations in a
very public way, raising the cost of backsliding or reneging. Second, quadrennial review entails
substantive ratchet effects: succeeding Committee recommendations contain increasingly
detailed, concrete reform proposals that provide a basis for policy debates. Third, Committee
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feedback, informed by prior discussions of difficulties in specific national contexts, leads to
demonstrably more responsive reports and ultimately better policy implementation, which tends
to cumulate with the number of reporting cycles. The cumulative and recursive nature of these
interactions helps to raise domestic expectations of government compliance.
Our arguments have limitations and scope conditions. We do not claim that mobilization
is the only consequence of reporting; bureaucratic learning and socialization without a broader
public response are also possible. We also do not claim that reporting is the only domestic
stimulus. Rather, the process encourages mobilization on the margins. Self-reporting is important
not because it completely reorients human rights, but rather because it sets in motion processes
that cumulatively nudge implementation and practice in the right direction.
Finally, we acknowledge that such nudges are going to be more effective in some types
of regimes than in others. The risk of repression tends to overwhelm the benefits of mobilization
in stable autocracies (Simmons 2009:144-54). After testing for the effects of cumulative
participation for all CAT ratifiers in Section III, reasonable scope conditions lead us to
investigate detailed evidence for mobilization processes in Latin America, where the mechanism
we describe is plausibly operative.

III.

Evidence: Cumulative Effects of Reporting and Review on Torture

Does self-reporting contribute to better rights practices in states that are party to human
rights agreements? This section examines empirically how the history of a government’s
engagement with the report-and-review process affects subsequent practices.

13

Dependent Variable: Torture and Cruel and Inhumane Treatment

The first issue is to select an appropriate dependent variable. Ideally, we would like a finegrained measure that detects the many inhumane practices—from physical degrading treatment
to psychological abuse, from cruel prison conditions to disappearances—that are regulated by the
CAT. Existing data on human rights practices are highly aggregated, making change quite
difficult to detect statistically. In addition, a measure that is responsive to the problem of
changing data availability over time is desirable. The Latent Human Rights Protection Scores
(which we refer to below as “Protection Scores”) produced by Fariss (2014) are the most
appropriate among the available options, of which none are perfect. We prefer this measure to
the best-known alternative, the torture scores in the CIRI Human Rights Dataset (Cingranelli and
Richards 2008), for two reasons. First, we prefer a measure that adjusts for the possibility of
changing standards of accountability. The Protection Scores are based on a dynamic modeling
process to account for temporal biases in the underlying data. Second, they are based on a range
of abuses with which the CAT is concerned and are regularly discussed by the Committee, such
as extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary detention. 10 Admittedly, these
scores have some disadvantages, including difficulties in substantive interpretation of effects (the
score represents the number of standard deviations a given observation is away from 0, which
represents the average level of human rights protection within all observations over time).
Despite this difficulty, the Protection Scores are the most appropriate choice available for our

See, e.g. Committee against Torture, Communication No. 456/2011: Decision adopted by the Committee at its
fifty-fourth session, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/54/D/456/2011 (15 May 2015), para. 6.5.
10
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purposes at this time. We do, however, provide alternative analyses using the CIRI torture score
as the outcome variable in Appendix A. 11
Because the act of treaty ratification itself generates the expectation of report submission,
we focus on states parties to the Convention Against Torture. We collected panel data on CAT
report submission by 154 states parties between 1988-2014. Of these, fifty-three states have
participated in three or more full report-and-review cycles. Figure 1 compares trends in the
moving global average of the Protection Scores across three categories of CAT parties: those that
have never reported; those that have completed one to two reporting cycles; and those with three
or more complete reporting cycles. All groups appear to improve. States that have engaged most
frequently in reporting cycles by 2014 evince greater and more consistent improvements in
human rights protections, while the non-reporters—despite starting out with better protection
levels—are overtaken by those who have engaged at least moderately with the CmAT (Figure 1).

Following the suggestion by Fariss (2014: Appendix K), we also provide alternative analyses using the CIRI
torture score as the outcome variable and adjust for temporal bias by including the lagged Protection Score variable
from the dynamic standard model. See Appendix B.

11
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Figure 1: Trends in Protection Scores by Reporting Group. Figure plots the average Protection Scores in a
given year for: (1) countries that had ratified the CAT but not submitted any reports by 2014; (2) countries
that had submitted 1-2 reports by 2014; and (3) countries that submitted 3+ reports by 2014. Score below
0 indicates a country falls below the average human rights protections provided, scores above 0 indicate
above-average human rights protections.

Research Design and Estimation Strategy

Our empirical problem is a subtle one. Torture practices are multi-causal, tied to deep
cultural practices and governing dysfunctions, are often committed by decentralized agents, and
are therefore difficult to influence under any circumstances. Furthermore, self-reporting and
review was never expected to affect rights practices through a single report submission, as we
have emphasized. Modeling the effects of a single-shot treatment alone would miss the dynamic
and cumulative nature of periodic review, since both the act of reporting and the cumulative
nature of the review process represent treatment variables. Additionally, because time-varying
16

factors can be both pre-treatment confounders in one period and post-treatment variables in
another, including them in a conventional regression model induces post-treatment bias, but
failing to include them results in omitted variable bias. 12 To attempt to adjust for these
confounders, we fit a marginal structural model, using an inverse probability of treatment
weighting estimator, which adjusts for intermediate confounders while avoiding bias from
conditioning on a post-treatment variable (Robins, et al. 2000, Blackwell 2013).
This approach entails two steps. First, we estimate a model for treatment in each time
period, conditional on time-varying confounders and past reporting history. We estimate the
probability of undergoing review with a logit model and the parameter vector for the model with
a pooled logistic regression, with country-year as the unit of analysis. This permits us first to
estimate the probability, in each period, that the state party would receive the treatment history
that it in fact did. Then, we fit a regression model for the outcome, Protection Score, given
treatment and treatment history, by weighting each observation with the inverse of its treatment
probabilities calculated in the first step. This weighting scheme effectively adjusts for
confounding by observed and time-varying confounders (Robins, et al. 2000). The parameters of
this weighted regression model yield more accurate estimates than traditional regression, but we
want to be clear that it does not completely overcome issues that may arise due to selection into
the self-reporting process based on unobservable factors. Examination of the trends in Figure 1
suggest, however, that selection into the reporting process may not in itself seriously undermine
our results.
The weighting models used to estimate the probability of undergoing review at time t
include covariates expected to influence both the decision to undergo periodic review and rights

12

For conventional regression model estimates, see Appendix A, Table A6.
17

practices. We give special attention to the fact that difficult to observe factors such as state
capacity and a polity’s values affect willingness to both report and to improve rights practices.
Institutional capacity (measured by the existence of a National Human Rights Institution
(NHRI)), a stronger normative commitment to the CAT regime (an Article 22 declaration
accepting the jurisdiction of the CmAT to receive individual complaints), and regional reporting
density all substantially increase a government’s probability of reporting. We further tap capacity
to report and effect real changes in torture practices by including logged GDP per capita and
logged population (from the World Bank), as well as Transparency Index scores developed by
Hollyer, Rosendorf and Vreeland. 13 A government’s diffuse normative commitment to robust
human rights protections is proxied by the percentage of core international human rights treaties
ratified; whether a country is party to a regional human rights mechanism, its Polity IV score;
and its lagged Protection Scores. Finally, we control for a country’s long-term liberal experience
with a set of binary variables indicating whether, since World War II or post-war independence,
a country never scored a 5 or above on the Polity scale (never democratic); whether the country
is undergoing or underwent a democratic transition (moving from below an 8 to an 8 or above
on the Polity scale); and whether a country had undergone a democratizing transition (a yearly
increase of 3 or more units on the Polity scale) during either of the two previous years. All timevarying covariates are lagged one year. In effect, we have taken every reasonable precaution to
capture capacities, institutions, and values that are themselves likely to reduce torture, including
many that would reduce a government’s (admittedly unobservable) “will” to do so.

The Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland index models transparency as the government’s collection and public
dissemination of aggregate economic data, based on a Bayesian item response model predicting the (non-) reporting
of data in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators data series. The authors contend that this measure
captures both a government’s willingness and its capacity to collect and distribute data (Hollyer, et al. 2014:416).
We also run all analyses excluding the transparency index (see Appendix A).
13
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In addition to these confounders, the weighting includes each state’s history with CmAT
periodic review. This permits us to estimate the average treatment effect of both the single-shot
treatment of undergoing review and the history of a country’s engagement with the review
process. These treatment history variables include: the total number of in-person CmAT reviews
undertaken by a country by time t; whether the country had undergone review in the previous
year; and the number of years since the last review. 14 All weighting models include year fixed
effects (see Table 1 for a list of all covariates included in both steps of the model.
In a second step, we use the weights generated in the first step to fit an inverse-probability
weighted model to estimate the effects of the key treatments: CmAT review and the review
process on Protection Scores at year t+2. Recognizing that a government’s human rights
legislation and practices often cannot change instantaneously, we model rights outcomes two
years following review by the expert committee. 15 All models include a linear time trend.
Confidence intervals were obtained using a cluster bootstrap procedure for the entire two-stage
weighting and fitting procedure, clustering on country. 16

Following Blackwell (2013) and Cole and Hernan (2008), we conducted a preliminary model check based on the
final distributions of the stabilized weights for each year. The stabilized weights’ means at each point in time are all
close to one, with their upper bounds relatively low, indicating we have estimated a set of fairly well-behaved
weights. See Appendix A, Table A1 for regression coefficients for the weighting models.
15
Unreported models estimating review and review process effects on the Protection Scores for years t+3, and t+4
do not change the main thrust of our findings, although the substantive effect for some treatment history variables is
slightly larger. We report the more modest results for two years following review, given how attenuated the direct
impact of the review process is likely to be on policy outcomes and practices the further removed in time from
domestic attention it becomes.
16
We ran 20,000 iterations and took the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the bootstrapped distribution for the
marginal structural model parameter estimates.
14
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Table 1. Covariates included in Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting Model (step 1) and
Marginal Structural Model (step 2).
Step 1: Weighting Model
(predicting CmAT Review. Appendix A, Table A1)
•

•

•

•

CAPACITY
o GDP per capita (logged)
o Population (logged)
o National Human Rights Institution
o Transparency Index
DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS
o Polity IV Score
o Never Democratic
o Transition to Democracy
o Democratizing transition
INTERNATIONAL VALUES:
o Latent Human Rights Protection Score (Protection Score)
o % Core Human Rights Treaties Ratified
o CAT Article 22 Acceptance
o CAT Regional Reporting Density
o Regional human rights membership
TREATMENT HISTORY
o Number of previous CmAT Reviews
o CmAT Review in the previous year
o Number of years since last CmAT Review

Step 2: Marginal Structural Model
(predicting Protection Scores at t+2. Appendix A, Table A2)
•
•
•
•
•
•

Stabilized Inverse Probability of Treatment Weights
Never Democratic
CmAT Review
CmAT Review in the previous year
Number of years since last CmAT Review
Number of previous CmAT Reviews

Figure 2 plots the estimated effects of the review process along with bootstrapped 95%
confidence intervals. The effect of a single report-and-review cycle is barely statistically

20

distinguishable from 0, with a small effect size of 0.149. 17 However, there is a significant (at p <
0.01) effect of review history on human rights practices at time t+2. We estimate that a country
that goes through one additional reporting-and-review cycle will, on average, have a Protection
Score that is approximately 0.234 units greater than a country that did not undergo an additional
review. This is an important improvement. It is only slightly less, for instance, than the 0.267
unit improvement in Argentina’s Protection Score between 2004 and 2005, a period during
which newly-elected President Nestor Kirchner took steps to purge the country’s military and
police leadership of authoritarian elements and reform the Federal Police. 18

Figure 2: Estimated CmAT review treatment and treatment history effects. Circles represent
estimated effect of undergoing a single review (compared to not undergoing review) at time t and
undergoing one additional review at time t, on Protection Scores at t+2. Lines denote 95% clusterbootstrapped confidence intervals (20,000 iterations, clustering on country). See Appendix A,
Tables A2 and A4 for all outcome model coefficients and respective bootstrapped confidence
intervals.

In alternative model specifications, the effect of a single report-and-review cycle becomes statistically
indistinguishable from zero. See Appendix A, Table A3.
18
Argentina’s Protection Score was 0.437 in 2004, 0.704 in 2005, and 1.066 by 2013.
17
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Similarly, this estimated effect represents an improvement comparable to the immediate
impact of a democratizing transition. By way of comparison, Ukraine’s Protection Score
improved 0.185 units between 2004 and 2005, following the Orange Revolution and the election
of opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko, which initially appeared to lay the groundwork for
further democratization. 19 While modest in size, this finding does suggest that governments that
engage in more dialogue with the CmAT are somewhat less likely to engage in frequent rights
violations over time. The review process may provide an opening for incremental improvements
over time, even if the quality of initial reporting is not especially high.
How sensitive are these results to the possibility of unobserved confounding factors for
which we have not successfully controlled? Figure 3 presents results of a sensitivity analysis
(Blackwell 2013: 516-8). Suppose states that participate in CmAT review are truly better human
rights performers for reasons we cannot observe (and therefore have not addressed within our
models) than states that do not participate. This parameter, denoted by α, represents the
“unexplained” difference between treated and untreated countries in the underlying propensity to
respect physical integrity rights. Positive values of α denote situations where treated countries
have better human rights records than the control group, while negative values of α assume
treated countries have worse human rights records. α = 0 denotes the original effect estimate.
Sensitivity analysis varies α across a range of values and re-estimates the treatment history effect
after adjusting for the assumed amount of unobserved confounding, allowing us to estimate how
much confounding it would take to lose confidence in the finding that review history improves
physical integrity rights.
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Ukraine’s Protection Score was 0.058 in 2004 and 0.243 in 2005.
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The sensitivity analysis demonstrates that the estimated effect of undergoing an
additional CmAT review retains significance at conventional levels (p < 0.05) until α = 0.1 (a bit
under one-third the treatment effect size). The results also hold for greater amounts of
confounding with 90% confidence intervals. For example, when α = 0.16, a little over half of the
treatment effect size, the estimated positive effect of review history remains statistically
significant at p < 0.10. In short, we find support for the conclusion that the constructive dialogue
with the CmAT as an ongoing process on average improves rights practices on the ground.

Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis for review history effect. Dotted and dashed lines denote
90% and 95% cluster-bootstrapped confidence intervals respectively (20,000 iterations,
clustering on country).
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IV.

Three Illustrations: Mobilizing for Human Rights around Reporting
These findings provide evidence that repeated self-reporting and review generates

positive incremental improvements. In this section, we explore evidence suggesting that
domestic mobilization may be at work in contributing to these rights improvements. We focus on
Latin American because it exemplifies our scope conditions. Furthermore, torture has historically
been a serious issue in the region and reporting to the CmAT has varied across countries and
over time. Combined with its history of relatively democratic institutions, active civil society,
and meaningful press freedom, Latin America is a plausible candidate to investigate the potential
for the periodic review process to acquire some level of publicity and to focus public attention on
torture practices.
If the review process provides information that sparks and facilitates domestic
mobilization, we would expect it to be publicly visible (Kälin 2012:41). Specifically, we look for
three observable implications: (1) mobilization of domestic civil society in the form of shadow
reports submitted for all CAT states parties; (2) discussion of the report and review process in
local media across Latin America; and (3) evidence that legislators take note of Committee
recommendations in their deliberations. If the international reporting process helps to stimulate
domestic policy change, traces should appear in civil society activities, public discussions, and
legislative debates.

Civil Society Mobilization: Shadow Reporting

Many who criticize self-reporting under the human rights treaty system assume that
governments are generally unwilling to be very self-critical. Fortunately, self-reporting is
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embedded in broader processes that stimulate societal attention by and information from a range
of non-state actors. For many years, civil society organizations have been permitted and in fact
encouraged to provide reports that supplement and in some cases correct the information states
themselves provide—so-called ‘shadow reports.’ 20 These reports are clear markers of civil
society activation and mobilization. Shadow reports are circulated to the CmAT and are made
public online. 21 CmAT members refer to civil society information when questioning government
representatives in-person and often rely on this alternative information when making their formal
recommendations.
Figure 4 displays the average number of shadow reports submitted for the forty-nine
reporting cycles reviewed between 2007-2014. 22 The CmAT typically receives more than five
alternative accounts of how the treaty is being implemented for each state report received. Global
NGOs (such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International) provide many of these
alternative accounts, but in every year save two, the CmAT received more shadow reports from
domestic or locally-based organizations than from their international counterparts. Moreover, the
number of reports submitted by domestic organizations under-represents the extent of local
mobilization, as most are compiled and submitted by broad coalitions of local organizations.

For a description. see: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/NGOsNHRIs.aspx (last visited 21
October 2017).
21
Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/countries.aspx (last visited 21 October
2017).
22
The CmAT only began systematically posting shadow reports in 2007, so we have reliable data for 2007-2014.
20
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Figure 4: Average number of shadow submissions per State Report per year, categorized
by source of shadow report. A shadow report is coded as local or domestic if the civil
society organization is based in-country and took primary responsibility for compiling the
report, even if assisted by an international non-governmental organization. A report is
coded as international if submitted by an NGO not based in-country and operating on a
(near-) global scale. NHRI refers to an alternative report submitted by a country’s
designated National Human Rights Institution (in most cases these are independent of the
government).
The worse a government’s record of torture, the greater the extent of shadow reporting
around its periodic review. 23 Organizations expended hardly any effort to provide alternative
information where torture is minimal. When governments engage in torture more regularly,
however, this tends to stimulate around 2 to 3 alternative local reports. 24 For example, Ecuador’s
2009 report elicited a shadow report from the local Foundation for Integral Rehabilitation of
Victims of Violence, detailing ill-treatment in places of detention inconsistent with the
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While there is a positive correlation between the government’s torture score and shadow reporting, there is
practically no relationship between the quality of the report and incidence of shadow reporting. This suggests that
civil society organizations tend to prepare their reports in response to government practices, rather than as a retort to
a whitewashed report.
24
See Appendix C, Figure C1.
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government’s account. 25 These inconsistencies were in turn echoed in the CmAT’s concluding
observations. 26 Local organizations regularly expose instances where protections governments
claim are in place are not applied in practice, as was the case with respect to ill-treatment against
institutionalized persons with disabilities in Mexico. 27 For understandable reasons, local groups
are much more reluctant than international NGOs to offer shadow reports on governments that
torture systematically, a pattern consistent with models that emphasize transnational NGO
“boomerangs” and domestic mobilization (Keck and Sikkink 1998:Ch.1).
This descriptive evidence suggests that shadow reporting is (1) common, (2) commonly
mobilizes local organizations, and (3) tends to target governments whose torture practices are
significant but not among the most repressive. This supports the plausibility of the claim that the
reporting process has become an opportunity for civil society to organize with new information
and to demand change.

Information Dissemination: Self-reporting in the Local Media

Broad societal mobilization depends at least initially on publicly available information
that self-reporting has taken place and the issues on which it has focused. To establish the
plausibility of this pathway, we identified the top three national newspapers by circulation 28 in

Committee against Torture, Summary Record of the 966th meeting, forty-fifth session: Consideration of reports
submitted by States parties under article 19 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.966 (16 November 2010),
para. 65.
26
Committee against Torture, Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture: Ecuador, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/ECU/CO/4-6 (7 December 2010), para. 16 (noting very different information from shadow reports compared
to the government report).
27
Committee against Torture, Summary Record of the 1098th meeting, forty-ninth session: Consideration of reports
submitted by States parties under article 19 of the Convention, U.N. Doc CAT/C/SR.1098 (26 April 2013), paras. 7,
16.
28
We used www.pressreference.com, supplemented with queries to regional and country experts or citizens.
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fifteen Latin American countries, and for each paper searched as many years as possible between
CAT ratification and the present. We collected all news articles mentioning the CAT, the CmAT,
and/or the periodic review process 29 published by a newspaper within and about the state party,
regardless of whether or not a state had in fact met its reporting obligation(s). Each relevant
article was then coded for whether it mentioned the focal state’s CAT obligations, its relations
with the CmAT, and/or the review process and CmAT recommendations specifically. If the
‘constructive dialogue’ with the CmAT matters to domestic constituencies, we should see a spike
in press references, followed by a somewhat higher degree of attention to torture, CAT, and the
CmAT during and after the review year.
Domestic media evidence does indeed suggest that the reporting process reverberates
locally throughout much—though certainly not all—of the region. Figure 5 demonstrates a spike
in local press attention to the review process during the year of CmAT review (year 0) for all
Latin American countries searched. Moreover, media attention to the CmAT continues after the
formal review concludes. In the year following review, the press continues to report on the
recommendations issued by the Committee, but also provides greater coverage of CAT
obligations generally compared with the years prior to review. Time and space preclude a
detailed discussion of each of the fifteen national media profiles, but additional discussion and
figures by country can be found in Appendix D.

Search terms in Spanish and Portuguese were translated equivalents of: ‘convention against torture,’ ‘committee
against torture’, ‘committee’ + ‘torture’, ‘convention’ + ‘torture’, and ‘torture’.
29
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Figure 5: Domestic Media Coverage of the Torture Convention in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Figure indicates the number of domestic newspaper articles that reference
the CAT, the CmAT, or the in-person periodic review and/or the concluding observations and
recommendations issued by the CmAT (Review/Recs). Total articles within each country’s searchable
time period were summed and averaged. Articles are centered around the year of review (0).

Mexico and Venezuela top the totals with more than thirty articles in their respective
national presses the year of their CAT review. Media attention in Mexico has focused on the
CmAT’s response to the government’s reports in detail and spans the political leanings of
newspapers. Since 2005, when systematic electronic search became possible for the major
Mexican papers, Mexico’s moderate left paper (El Universal) has published twenty-one articles
that referenced the CAT in some way, with eight specifically about the periodic review process
or CmAT recommendations. Slightly to the political right and aimed more squarely at an elite
business audience (though still decidedly independent), La Reforma in Mexico has published
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thirty-one articles referencing the CAT since 1995, with eleven specifically on the periodic
review process or CmAT recommendations. Many were critical of the government or explicitly
highlighted the differences between the government’s submission and shadow reports. 30
Mexico’s La Prensa—with a wider circulation but a reputation for sensationalism—published
fifteen articles since 2011 referencing the CAT, fourteen of which commented on the periodic
review process and/or CmAT recommendations. Strengthening the plausibility of reporting
spurring public information dissemination to support mobilization, media coverage clusters in
time around the CmAT’s list of recommendations.
Because Venezuela’s reporting has been spotty, the CmAT and the periodic review
process remained virtually invisible in domestic media until twenty-five articles reported on the
2014 review of Venezuela’s combined third and fourth reports. The pages of both El Universal
(a somewhat conservative, business-oriented newspaper) and El Nacional (slightly more to the
left) were saturated with news of the proceedings, reporting on claims and counter-claims. 31
Press reports in Colombia exhibit a spike in attention to torture the year of review, strong
attention the following year, and then moderate sustained attention that exceeds pre-review
levels thereafter. The centrist El Tiempo has a prolific history of publicizing the reporting and
response process over the last twenty years. It has published eighteen articles on the CAT,
fourteen of which made specific mention of CmAT recommendations for Columbia, criticizing
the state for out-of-control security forces, 32 practices by the military that amount to torture, 33

See, for example, La Reforma, “Denuncian que persiste la tortura en Mexico,” 28 April 1997.
El Universal, “Naciones Unidas evaluará al país por lucha contra tortura,” 29 September 2014; “Presentarán casos
de tortura y trato cruel ante comisión de la ONU,” 3 November 2014; El Universal, “Gobierno y activistas debatirán
sobre la tortura en la ONU,” 6 November 2014; “Tortura ante la ONU,” 9 November 2014; El Nacional, “Comité
contra la Tortura exigió explicaciones sobre los colectivos,” 7 November 2014; Últimas Noticias, “Comité de la
ONU: Situación del sistema penitenciario venezolano es ‘una tragedia’,” 28 November 2014.
32
El Tiempo, “ Combatir mas la tortura le pide naciones unidas a Colombia,” 14 December 1995.
33
El Tiempo, “A la ONU le preocupan medidas del president,” 28 November 2003.
30
31
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and the failing judicial system. 34 When dialogue over Colombia’s fourth report became quite
drawn out between 2008 and 2012, media references to the CAT became much more common.
Several other states demonstrate similar patters to those graphed in Figure 5. In
Argentina, some fifteen articles appeared in well-respected and widely circulating publications,
the timing of which is consistent with the mobilizing power of review and dialogue: they are
clustered in years just after Argentina’s reports are discussed at the CmAT and approximately
when recommendations were issued (1997/98, 2004/05, and 2010). The Chilean press has also
reported consistently on the periodic review process, often mere days after Chile’s reports were
examined by the CmAT. In May 2009—two days after CmAT’s review of Chile’s report—the
center-right La Tercera reported on an exchange between the International Federation of Human
Rights and the government about Chile’s compliance with international standards and
obligations under the CAT. 35 In 2010, CmAT recommendations that Chile reform its antiterrorism law were noted in the center-right El Mercurio. 36 Paraguayan media provided fairly
significant coverage (nine articles) of the 2011 review, some predominantly praising the
government’s policies with others notably more critical, 37 representing dense media coverage
concentrated right around the time of CmAT review. Countries with far less press coverage of
the CmAT review process include Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, largely because these
states underwent reporting and review much less frequently.
Overall, press records for Latin America demonstrate a spike in reporting within local news
media around the time the CmAT reviews government reports and issues its recommendations
El Tiempo, “Debate por efecto de extradicion de ex jefes ‘paras’ a E.U. en ley de Justicia y Paz,” 26 November
2009.
35
La Tercera, “Federación de DDHH acusa `rebajas en exceso' de penas a crímenes de lesa humanidad en Chile,” 7
May 2009; “Ministerio de Justicia refuta dichos de federación de DDHH sobre tortura en Chile,” 7 May 2009.
36
El Mercurio, “Relator de la ONU reitera llamado para reforma a Ley Antiterrorista,” 25 September 2010.
37
For example, La Nacion, “Paraguay presentó Informe sobre derechos humanos,” 4 November 2011; ABC Color,
“Valoran iniciativas a favor de los DD.HH.,” 6 November 2011.
34
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for improvement. 38 Latin American newspapers have broadly disseminated information about
the process of review and CmAT recommendations, contributing grist for public discussions of
how (and whether) to implement the CAT.

Political Attention: Self-Reporting in Legislative Debates

The review process is ultimately about implementing treaty obligations that lead to
incremental improvements in physical integrity practices on the ground. Much of the action must
necessarily take place in law- and policy-making settings. The vast majority of CAT obligations
cannot be implemented without legislative action. For instance, states parties must criminalize
torture, make local law consistent with the treaty’s definition of torture, and “make these
offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature.” 39 The
CmAT views changes to criminal procedure codes dealing with detention, interrogation, rights to
redress, and due process rights as key reforms to align a country’s domestic laws with CAT
obligations. As the reporting process iterates, recommendations gain legislative attention. We
thus expect legislative discussion about the strength of criminal laws and policies to be one
pathway through which the information generated by the report-and-review process facilitates
mobilization by politicians and affects rights outcomes on the ground.
To investigate the plausibility of this claim, we collected transcripts of legislative debates
from the official online records for three Latin American states parties—Chile, Argentina, and

We found little coverage of CmAT dialogue in the smaller states in Latin America, but were limited by minimal
electronic access to news databases. See Appendix D for notes on Guyana, Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Honduras and Guatemala.
39
CAT, Article 4. CAT, Article 2(1) also requires states parties to “…take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”
38
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Mexico—and traced discussion and legislation linked to the specific issues emphasized by
CmAT recommendations. 40 We do not expect legislators to refer to all of the Committee
recommendations; we do expect that following CmAT review, legislators will refer to
recommendations that either aligned with their policy preferences, sparked public interest, or
were the subject of constituency mobilization. Moreover, iteration brings clarity and raises
expectations that at least some of the more salient recommendations will be implemented.
However, in countries with slow legislative processes, we might not see any calls to address
CmAT recommendations for years.
Evidence from Chile’s legislative records suggests significant albeit variable legislative
activity relating to the CAT and the review process between 2004 and 2016 (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. References to the CAT regime within Chile’s legislature (2004-2016). Figure displays the
percentage of all sessions held by the Senate and Chamber of Deputies in a given year in which at least
one legislator referenced the CAT regime, categorized by reference type: the treaty itself (CAT); the
We first filtered on debates that include reference to “tortura,” followed by a refined search for references to the
CAT, the CmAT, and/or the reporting process and recommendations.
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CmAT; or the periodic review process/recommendations. Horizontal dashed lines represent years in
which Chile either submitted a Report or the CmAT issued its concluding observations (Review).

There is good evidence that these references are specifically linked to legislative debates about
CmAT recommendations. CmAT review of Chile in 2004 coincided with greater domestic
attention to the issue of reparations for torture victims. During its review, the Committee
requested that Chile create a system to provide “adequate and fair reparation to victims of
torture, including rehabilitative measures and compensation.” 41 Later that same year, leftist
Deputies argued on numerous occasions that Chile had to provide such reparations to comply
with its obligations including those under CAT, although CmAT recommendations were not
explicitly referenced. 42 In this instance, the CmAT added its voice to domestic and international
calls for Chile to enhance reparations for torture victims, calls eventually heeded in a bill
approved relatively quickly by the Senate. 43
Chilean legislators also responded to the CmAT’s concluding observations of May 2009.
Topping the Committee’s recommendations was that Chile needed to make its domestic
definition of torture consistent with that found within the CAT, an issue also brought to the
Committee’s attention by mobilized Chilean civil society organizations. 44 By September of that
same year, President Bachelet presented a draft law to do just that, explicitly mentioning her

Committee against Torture, Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Chile, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/CR/32/5 (14 June 2004), para. 7(l).
42
República de Chile, Cámara de Diputados, Redacción de Sesiones, Legislatura 352a, Extraordinaria, Sesión 31a
(15 Deciembre 2004), pp. 43-44.
43
República de Chile, Promulga el Acuerdo entre el gobierno de la República de Chile y la Organización de las
Naciones Unidas, Decreto Núm. 156. Santiago, 31 Agosto 2007.
44
Report of the Chilean Civil Society to the United Nations Committee against Torture (April 2009), available at:
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/; Committee against Torture, Summary Record of the 877th Meeting: Consideration of
reports submitted by States parties under article 19 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.877 (17 June 2009),
para. 23; Committee against Torture, Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Chile,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CHL/CO/5 (23 June 2009), paras 10-11.
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intent to comply with the 2009 recommendations. Although this bill never made it out of the
Chamber of Deputies, a new bill was introduced in September 2014 to incorporate a definition of
torture into Chilean domestic law in line with its CAT obligations. The group of ten leftist
deputies introducing the bill declared it to be an explicit effort to comply with the Committee’s
recommendations, and the Chamber’s Human Rights Committee explicitly noted that certain
articles had been modified for the purpose of complying with these recommendations. The next
week, when the Chamber approved the draft bill for passage to the Senate, a number of leftist
legislators repeatedly referenced CAT and the 2009 recommendations. 45 When the bill arrived
on the Senate floor in 2016, its momentum stalled over an article codifying the inviolability of
the prohibition against torture. In support of this article, socialist senators vehemently argued that
making torture a crime not subject to amnesty, pardon, or statutes of limitations was necessary to
bring Chile into compliance with international law. However, these voices were drowned out by
concerns raised by both right- and left-wing senators that doing so would contradict other parts
of the Penal Code, which allows the application of statutes of limitations, amnesties, or pardons
to torture and crimes against humanity. 46 Though the bill passed and was eventually signed into
law, the article mandating inviolability was ultimately scrapped. 47
These cases constitute clear evidence that Chile’s legislative activity has interacted seriously
with the CmAT. It would be naïve, however, to suggest comprehensive legislative uptake.
Despite growing attention to the Committee’s recommendations, the Chilean Congress has
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The above discussion draws from República de Chile, Cámara de Diputados, Redacción de Sesiones, Legislatura
357a, Sesión 76a (8 septiembre 2009), p. 63; Legislatura 362a, Sesión 70a (23 septiembre 2014); Legislatura 363a,
Sesión 102a (9 diciembre 2015); and Legislatura 363a, Sesión 104a (15 diciembre 2015).
46
República de Chile, Senado, Diario de Sesiones, Legislatura 364a, Sesión 45a (6 septiembre 2016), pp. 40-66; and
Legislatura 364a, Sesión 51a (28 septiembre 2016).
47
República de Chile, Ley No. 20.968 (22 November 2016).
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debated but not repealed its ultra-sensitive amnesty laws or lifted the statute of limitations on
torture, both issues emphasized by the Committee.

Figure 7. References to the CAT regime within Argentina’s legislature (2001-2016). Figure displays
the percentage of all sessions held by the Senate and Chamber of Deputies in a given year in which at
least one legislator referenced the CAT regime, categorized by reference type: the treaty itself (CAT);
the CmAT; or the periodic review process/recommendations. Horizontal dashed lines represent years
in which Argentina either submitted a Report or the CmAT issued its concluding observations
(Review).

Argentina has taken much longer to respond to the CmAT than has Chile (see Figure 7). For
example, in 2004 CmAT recommended that Argentina establish a national torture prevention
mechanism with the authority to conduct prison inspections and investigate alleged instances of
torture. 48 Legislative activity to create such an institution lagged for eight years until a CmAT
Sub-Committee visit in the summer of 2012 directly spurred passage of a preliminary draft law.
Senator Artaza of the Radical Civil Union (UCR) supported the bill, explaining that
“representatives from CmAT will come again, and due to this we insist that this project is

Committee against Torture, Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Argentina,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/33/1 (10 November 2004), para. 7(o).
48
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incorporated into law in the fastest way possible…for this reason we ask that this matter is
handled urgently.” 49 Senator Pichetto of the Justicialista Party noted that the CmAT had
criticized Argentina for not maintaining a registry to record torture cases in the past, and
admonished his colleagues to do so. 50 The bill passed the Senate, with modifications approved
by the Chamber, officially creating a national torture prevention mechanism. 51 The prod of the
CAT reporting regime after years of initial delay seems especially evident in legislative debates
and activity in this case.
More generally, CmAT recommendations represent an additional opportunity for
legislators to advocate for attention to policies they and their constituents favor. The CmAT has
repeatedly criticized Argentina’s antiquated prison system. Their recommendations for prison
reform have been echoed by legislators from across the political spectrum and publicized by
Argentina’s local press when covering the need for prison reform. 52 To be clear, we do not claim
that the CmAT has “caused” legislative uptake, but rather that the report-and-review process
provides a focal set of recommendations for political and legislative attention to the issue. We
think of the process as an opportunity, or an opening for legislative discussions. For instance,
during a 2014 debate on updating the Penal Code, Deputy Torroba of the UCR warned “about
the shameful Argentine prison system, of medieval character, in which human rights are
systematically violated. On this topic, I refer to the last report from the UN Human Rights

República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Perído 130o, 12o Reunión, 8o
Sesión ordinaria (15 agosto 2012), p. 16.
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Ibid., Perído 130o, 20o Reunión, 24o Sesión ordinaria (14 noviembre 2012), pp. 40-42.
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República Argentina, Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Dirección de Taquígrafos, Periodo 130, 21a. Reunión,
18a. Sesión ordinaria (28 noviembre 2012).
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“Cárceles: dos de cada tres muertes son por violencia,” La Nacíon, 21 June 2005; “Indagan a Rosatti y a Beliz por
las cárceles,” La Nacíon, 9 September 2005; “Cárceles, los nuevos centros de tortura,” La Nacíon, 28 June 2006;
“Alerta de la ONU sobre la tortura,” Clarín, 29 November 2004; “La violencia en las carceles argentinas es cada vez
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Committee and CmAT.” 53 Referencing CmAT recommendations is of course not necessary for
legislators to advocate for prison reform, but to do so emphasizes the gravity and urgency of an
issue, particularly one that draws significant public attention.
In contrast to Argentina, the reporting process has evoked concentrated legislative
attention in Mexico over time (Figure 8). Opposition legislators have referred to the CmAT on
several occasions over the years to highlight their criticisms of torture in Mexico. In 1992, after
Mexico’s second periodic review, the Party of the Democratic Revolution—one of the three
major parties and social democratic in orientation—referred to CmAT findings to critique police
techniques that expedite investigations but may amount to torture. 54 The same review was used
to highlight impunity for torture and the failure to satisfactorily compensate victims. 55 The
Committee’s 2006 recommendations about arbitrary detention have been aired extensively in the
Chamber, eventually eliciting new rules against arbitrary arrests, requiring preliminary
investigations, and instituting training for law enforcement. 56
The Committee’s 2012 recommendations focused heavily on weaknesses within Mexico’s
legal framework to prevent, investigate, and adequately punish acts of torture. 57 These critiques
were echoed by civil society actors and covered in the Mexican press. 58 Subsequent to this
review, legislators made a concerted effort to reform this legal framework, often pointing to
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CmAT recommendations in support of specific reforms to the 1991 Federal Act for the
Prevention and Punishment of Torture. 59 This eventually culminated in the passage of an entirely
new law in June 2017 that considerably strengthened Mexico’s legal framework to prevent,
investigate, and punish acts of torture. 60

Figure 8. References to the CAT regime within Mexico’s legislature (1995-2014). Figure displays the
percentage of all sessions held by the Mexican Senate and Chamber of Deputies in a given year in
which at least one legislator referenced the CAT regime, categorized by reference type: the treaty
itself (CAT); the CmAT; or the periodic review process/recommendations. Horizontal dashed lines
represent years in which Mexico either submitted a Report or the CmAT issued its concluding
observations (Review).

See, e.g., La Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Diario de los Debates,
Legislatura LXII, Año II, Período Ordinario, Sesión No. 25 (22 octubre 2013).
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Crueles, Inhumanos o Degradantes, Nueva Ley DOF 26-06-2017.
59

39

V.

Conclusion

Self-reporting is a common mechanism—and often the only regularized official
mechanism the international community has—to encourage implementation of international
agreements. It is essential in many areas of international law, where external actors only
episodically are able and willing to collect information about the status of treaty implementation.
Regularized reporting constitutes an occasion that generates information around which civil
society can mobilize to demand progress. It also generates recommendations from external
human rights experts, which government officials can actively consider when debating
legislative and policy changes. This article has advanced a theory of domestic mobilization to
explain why the report-and-review process is useful, demonstrating its links with measurable
though modest progress in implementing international human rights obligations.
Critiques of the reporting and review process undertaken by the human rights treaty
bodies are far more common than rigorous assessments of their actual consequences. While we
do not dispute that there are weaknesses in the reporting system, the evidence presented suggests
that dialogue between state representatives and international experts—often referring to new
information collected by civil society and written up in shadow reports—may indeed disseminate
new perspectives, advice, and potentially produce pressure for change in practice. Committee
recommendations have made their way into important legislative changes, often by giving
opposition politicians a credible platform from which to advocate change. The dialogue
engendered through cumulative self-reporting has contributed to local improvements that
reduced the pervasiveness of torture in a number of countries (indeed, on average). As anyone
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would expect, the size of that improvement is not massive, but it is all the more believable for its
modest size.
This study has given careful attention to the obvious objection that states who report want
to improve their rights practices anyway, and so the consequences of the process are mere
selection effects. We have modeled reporting and rights improvements in two stages, taking into
account a wide range of proxies for unobservable qualities, such as capacities, values, and
political will. There may still be unobservable factors that we cannot measure with precision, but
sensitivity analysis suggests that these are unlikely to greatly disturb our positive findings.
It is also important to stress what we did not find. We found evidence that interactive
histories are important to such improvements; but modeling one-shot effects provided much
weaker evidence. The frequency and density of the reporting-and-dialogue process appear to be
related to rights improvements. This suggests that iterative and interactive histories are key.
Reporting per se does not produce the same results that a more intense and cumulative back-andforth between governments and the Committee appears to produce. This implies some potential
for constructive engagement to contribute to improving human rights practices around the world.
But we hasten to add that the reporting regime is not a comprehensive solution to the world’s
worst human rights abuses. We have only examined states that have ratified the CAT; even
among states parties it has proved impossible to coerce a meaningful conversation out of
unwilling states. That said, the results suggest that the reporting and review system should be
supported rather than disparaged. We agree with the critics who point out the problems of
stretched resources and redundant processes. But a look at the evidence suggests that selfreporting has played an important role in starting conversations that reverberate domestically and
open possibilities for change.
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The importance of these findings for international law and cooperation are profound.
Empirically, a majority of international agreements in a broad range of issue areas rely on little
more than self-reported information to be effective. A little over half of a random sample of
treaties deposited with the United Nations create some form of monitoring, whether selfmonitoring, third party surveillance, or a combination of both (Koremenos 2015:261). A recent
comprehensive study of all arms control agreements found that a significant plurality—or some
86 of 224 agreements in history—provide for self-reporting as the most intrusive form of
monitoring in the agreement (Vaynman 2014). Self-reporting is also a central pillar in
international environmental agreements. For example, the G20 Fossil Fuel Subsidy Agreement
depends almost exclusively on self-reporting by states parties (Aldy 2017:99). A regularized
review system within the World Trade Organization—the Trade Policy Review Mechanism—
combines centralized policy reviews with government self-reports (Mavroidis 1992:380-93).
To what extent is the theory of information production and domestic reverberation
stimulated by self-reporting generalizable? At a minimum, it is almost certainly applicable to
other areas of international human rights. We see near identical reporting requirements and
processes within every major multilateral human rights treaty. We would expect a similar
information and mobilization mechanism to operate wherever civil society has systematic access
to interactions between their government representatives and authoritative human rights experts
with a mandate to review practices and make recommendations. Indeed, similar results through
an analogous mechanism appear to be at work in the area of women’s rights.
Whether the issue area is human rights, the environment, trade, or arms control, the
mechanism theorized here depends on the existence of a process that involves transparent
interactions with an authoritative regulatory body on an ongoing basis. More critically, it
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depends on the presence of domestic stakeholders willing and able to reformulate their
expectations of and demands for their own governments based on new information. We
acknowledge that any link in this argument could fail: governments might refuse to engage the
self-reporting process; international experts could be corrupt or engage in malfeasance; fake
news could drown out factual information; domestic mobilization could fail to materialize if the
issue is not salient or if civil society faces serious repercussions for doing so. We also realize that
some issues do not engage broad publics, and implementation in these areas may be shaped more
by bilateral government reputations (arms control) or narrow organized interests (trade policy).
But the basic structure of the argument—that self-reporting can spark processes that lead to
greater transparency when compared to little or no oversight—has tremendous significance for
theories of international law compliance, which ultimately depends on political forms of
enforcement.
Systematic investigation into international report and review systems is highly warranted,
but we have only scratched the surface here. Self-reporting has long been a staple of domestic
regulatory governance, and abundant research has documented both its promise and its
limitations at the national level. Research on creative modes of governance that capitalize on
information, domestic mobilization, and recursive feedback is of growing importance in a world
in which traditional modes of international governance are being questioned (see generally Zürn
2004). Processes of “global experimentalist governance,” while fundamentally different from
human rights reporting in many ways, depend on participatory processes that respect local
contexts and knowledge and call for the imbrication of collectively defined international norms
with local democratic deliberation regarding implementation (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010:13, De
Búrca, et al. 2014:477-78). Informational nudges in the form of “global performance
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assessments” that attract public attention and nudge states to consider policy reforms in sensitive
areas is another area of research that similarly highlights subtle influences on policy (Kelley and
Simmons forthcoming). Self-reporting regimes are among the possibilities for governance in
areas in which traditional enforcement approaches are unavailable or ineffective. As part of a
broader agenda for research on global governance, it is crucial that scholars try to understand
whether and how one of the main pillars for international regulatory cooperation—information
dissemination and mobilization processes initiated largely by self-reporting procedures—actually
works.
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